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anticompetitive impact of reverse payment settlements—in which
branded and generic drug companies settle patent disputes, typically by
delaying the entry of generics into the market. Despite clear competition
concerns, these settlements are typically subject to a rule of reason
analysis that puts the burden on enforcers and plaintiffs to prove their
anticompetitive harms. Recent California legislation—AB 824—shifts
the burden to the settling drug companies to prove their arrangement is
not anticompetitive. AB 824 presents an opportunity for advocates of
lower drug costs but still faces hurdles and shortfalls. This Note examines
the efficacy of the legislation, the likelihood of it surviving pending
constitutional challenges, and how it fits into broader efforts at lowering
drug costs for consumers.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A branded drug company charges consumers monopoly prices for
its patented drug, enabled by a federal law that creates patent
exclusivity for a defined period of time. Spurred by other federal
legislation that permits the entry of generic competitors, a generic drug
company plans to enter the market. Concerned about the threat to its
monopoly power, the branded company sues the generic company for
infringement. Before reaching trial, the parties reach an agreement in
which the branded company will compensate the generic company to
keep its drug off the market. The branded company benefits from the
extension of its monopoly power, the generic company benefits from
the compensation provided by the settlement, and patients continue to
pay a premium.
This scenario looks like a classic restraint of trade, but is there
antitrust liability for these companies? Between 2005 and 2013, many
courts found no antitrust violations in these “pay-for-delay”
settlements.1 Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Federal
Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc.,2 courts have applied a “rule of
reason” analysis, but this analysis can be “complex and burdensome”
and could allow anticompetitive deals to slip through.3 In the reverse
payment context, the rule of reason—discussed more thoroughly in
Part II(E) of this Note—places the burden on enforcers and plaintiffs
to show that the generic “agreed to abstain from using the patented
innovation” and that there is an “unexplained payment” from the
branded drug company to the generic drug company.4
California’s recently passed legislation (Assembly Bill 824 (AB
824)), alternatively, shifts the burden to the settling companies to
prove their arrangement is not anticompetitive.5 Although this
1. See Study, Pay-for-Delay: How Drug Company Pay-Offs Cost Consumers Billions, Fed.
Trade Comm’n 1 (Jan. 2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/pay-delayhow-drug-company-pay-offs-cost-consumers-billions-federal-trade-commission-staff-study/
100112payfordelayrpt.pdf [hereinafter Pay-for-Delay Study]; In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust
Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006), abrogated by Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S.
136 (2013); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008),
abrogated by Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136 (2013).
2. 570 U.S. 136 (2013).
3. Id. at 144, 156; Robin Cooper Feldman, Defensive Leveraging in Antitrust, 87 GEO. L.J.
2079, 2107, 2112 (1999).
4. Robin C. Feldman & Prianka Misra, The Fatal Attraction of Pay-for-Delay, 18 CHI.-KENT
J. INTELL. PROP. 249, 259 (2019); Aaron Edlin et al., Activating Actavis, 28 ANTITRUST 16, 17–18
(2013).
5. Assemb. B. 824, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
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represents a leap forward for enforcers traditionally required to satisfy
a rule of reason analysis, it still comes with its own challenges and
questions. This Note will examine the state of play of reverse payment
arrangements, analyze how the recent California legislation compares
with common law and statutory antitrust provisions, and assess
whether this legislation can effectively combat pay-for-delay
settlements that extract large tolls from consumers.
Part II will discuss the structure of pay-for-delay arrangements,
the evolving state of the law related to pay-for-delay arrangements,
and the role of antitrust agencies in policing pay-for-delay settlements.
Part III will discuss the efficacy of AB 824, including potential
pitfalls, constitutional challenges to the law, and how this legislation
is situated within the overall proposals for pharmaceutical reform.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Structure of Pay-For-Delay Arrangements
While the precise terms vary from settlement to settlement, the
general structure of pay-for-delay arrangements is a quid pro quo
between branded drug companies and generic drug companies.6 After
the branded drug company files an infringement suit against the
generic, it provides something of value—traditionally, a monetary
settlement—to the generic drug company.7 However, this settlement
appears less like a traditional litigation settlement and more like an
agreement between competitors to restrain trade.8 The generic drug
company agrees to delay the market entry of its competing product for
a certain amount of time.9 The branded drug company thus remains
able to charge consumers higher prices while the generic receives a
portion of these monopoly profits. This arrangement allows both
parties to benefit while externalizing the costs to consumers.10
B. Dueling Legislative Policy Goals Permitting Pay-For-Delay
These reverse payment arrangements, and the toll they take on
consumers, stem from competing policy goals and legislative
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

See Feldman & Misra, supra note 4, at 249.
See id.
See id. at 257.
Id. at 249.
See id. at 256.
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frameworks. In hopes of incentivizing innovation, the United States
currently allows twenty-year patent protection.11 Further, certain
drugs have exclusivity periods that bar competitors from entering the
market.12 These protections are in place to allow pharmaceutical
companies to recover research and development costs.13 Limiting the
market in this way, however, has the potential to create monopolies
and price patients out of purchasing necessary drugs.14
While maintaining these protections for patented drugs, Congress
has also attempted to rein in drug costs. The Drug Price Competition
and Patent Term Restoration Act—commonly known as the HatchWaxman Act—promotes this goal by encouraging the entrance of
lower-cost generic drugs that compete with the higher-priced branded
drugs.15 This market entrance is facilitated by allowing the generic
applicant to use the branded drug’s trials to demonstrate its own safety
through the abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) process.16
ANDA thus relieves generic companies of costly drug trials that
represent a high barrier to entry. The first generic to file and obtain
this approval gains a 180-day exclusivity period, creating a six-month

11. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2018) (“[S]uch grant shall be for a term beginning on the date on
which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the application for the patent
was filed in the United States . . . .”); Frequently Asked Questions on Patents and Exclusivity, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/drugs/development-approval-processdrugs/frequently-asked-questions-patents-and-exclusivity#howlongpatentterm (last visited Oct. 4,
2020).
12. Frequently Asked Questions on Patents and Exclusivity, supra note 11.
13. See C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a
Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1562–63, 1562 n.25 (2006) (“For
blockbuster drugs as with blockbuster films, the ability to legally exclude rivals from offering a
copy preserves the return from a massive initial investment.”); Feldman & Misra, supra note 4, at
254–55.
14. Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., Pharmaceutical Policy in the United States in 2019: An
Overview of the Landscape and Avenues for Improvement, 30 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 421, 453
(2019) (“Once a drug is approved, the brand-name manufacturer sets its initial price in the United
States at what the manufacturer estimates that the market will bear. . . . As a result, most brandname drugs cost far more in the United States than in other comparable settings around the world.
Another distinct feature of the U.S. market is that manufacturers tend to increase prices over time
prior to expiration of market exclusivity even in the absence of new information about the drug’s
value.”).
15. Feldman & Misra, supra note 4, at 253; Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 13, at
1565; see also Patent Drug Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. ch. 9).
16. Feldman & Misra, supra note 4, at 254; 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2018).
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duopoly where only the generic and branded drugs compete.17
Securing this approval and exclusivity is usually lucrative for generic
manufacturers, potentially allowing revenues of several hundred
million dollars.18
A generic applying through ANDA and planning to compete with
a branded drug must submit a certification, which includes a statement
that the branded drug’s patent is “invalid or will not be infringed by
the manufacture, use, or sale” of the generic.19 But filing this
application constitutes an actionable infringement of the branded
drug’s patent.20 The ostensible goal was to allow generics to resolve
potential infringement claims and challenge weak patents, rather than
be found to have infringed after the costly process of bringing the drug
to market.21 This permits branded drug companies to sue their
potential generic competitors and serves as the basis for pay-for-delay
settlements.
C. Pay-For-Delay Benefits and Costs
A challenge to the branded drug’s monopoly has the potential to
cost its manufacturer billions of dollars.22 Though generics have had a
73 percent success rate in cases where they have challenged branded
drugs, there is always uncertainty in patent litigation, and a generic
drug’s immediate rollout comes with costs to its manufacturer.23 A
17. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv); Feldman & Misra, supra note 4, at 255 (“[I]f the generic
wins and the branded drug patents are invalidated, duopoly between the generic drug and the
branded drug will begin immediately, potentially costing the brand manufacturer billions of
dollars . . . .”).
18. Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 13, at 1579.
19. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV); see also Feldman & Misra, supra note 4, at 254;
Hemphill, supra note 13, at 1565.
20. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2018); Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 13, at 1566.
Such infringement, however, does not make the generic manufacturer liable for damages. See
Feldman & Misra, supra note 4, at 254 (“While the expense and risk of litigation is a deterrent to
the generic companies, they do not face liability for damages from sales of the product, if the patent
is found valid given that they have not actually engaged in any sales.”).
21. Motion and Brief of Representative Henry A. Waxman as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 7, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Schering-Plough Corp., 548 U.S. 919 (2005) (No. 05-273),
2005 WL 2462026, at *7.
22. C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and Rulemaking
to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 635 (2009) (“The two drug makers have
a powerful incentive to settle. For a blockbuster drug with billions of dollars in annual sales, a
brand-name firm has billions to lose from generic competition.”).
23. FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC
STUDY vi (2002), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/generic-drug-entry-
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settlement providing immediate benefits to generic manufacturers and
extending the branded manufacturer’s monopoly creates substantial
benefits for both parties.24
This resolution is mutually beneficial to the parties—branded
drug companies and generic drug manufacturers. However, it
externalizes costs to third parties by burdening patients and insurance
companies with unnecessarily extended monopoly prices. In 2009,
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Commissioner Jon Leibowitz
calculated that “a conservative estimate of potential savings [for
consumers] from a ban on pay for delay settlements” amounted to $3.5
billion per year.25 Another study found that a one-year delay in the
generic’s market entry represented a consumer cost of approximately
$12 to $14 billion.26 This study also highlighted the welfare loss
resulting from the changes to consumers’ and insurance companies’
purchasing decisions.27
D. Antitrust Laws and Agency Enforcement
The traditional bases for federal antitrust enforcement are the
Sherman Act of 1890, the Clayton Act of 1914, and the Federal Trade
Commission Act of 1919 (“FTC Act”).28 “To establish liability under
[section 1 of the Sherman Act], a plaintiff must prove (1) the existence
of an agreement, and (2) that the agreement was in unreasonable
restraint of trade.”29 Proving a Sherman Act section 2 monopolization
violation requires showing: “(a) the possession of monopoly power in
the relevant market; (b) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that
power; and (c) causal ‘antitrust’ injury.”30 Section 7 of the Clayton
prior-patent-expiration-ftc-study/genericdrugstudy_0.pdf (“Generic applicants have prevailed in
73 percent of the cases in which a court has resolved the patent dispute.”).
24. Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 13, at 1580–81.
25. Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Speech at the Center for American
Progress, “Pay-for-Delay” Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Industry: How Congress Can Stop
Anticompetitive Conduct, Protect Consumers’ Wallets, and Help Pay for Health Care Reform (the
$35 Billion Solution) 14 (June 23, 2009), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public
_statements/pay-delay-settlements-pharmaceutical-industry-how-congress-can-stopanticompetitive-conduct-protect/090623payfordelayspeech.pdf [hereinafter Leibowitz Speech].
26. Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust, supra note 22, at 650.
27. Id. at 636.
28. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2018); id. §§ 12–27; id. §§ 41–58.
29. Aerotec Int’l, Inc. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 836 F.3d 1171, 1178 (9th Cir. 2016).
30. Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp. LP, 592 F.3d 991, 998 (9th
Cir. 2010) (quoting Cal. Comput. Prods., Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 735 (9th
Cir. 1979)).
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Act prohibits acquisitions when “the effect of such acquisition may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”31
The FTC Act empowers the FTC to bring antitrust law enforcement
suits on its own authority.32 These laws create clear avenues to
antitrust enforcement and empower agencies to sue. However, as
discussed below, the difficulty in preventing these agreements lies in
courts’ abilities to detect anticompetitive behavior and reticence to
challenge the state-sanctioned monopoly created by the branded drug
company’s patents.33
Antitrust agencies have applied these laws and taken action at the
federal and state levels. In recent years, the FTC has brought several
pay-for-delay cases through federal court and administrative
complaints.34 In these cases, the FTC has sought injunctions against
similar future agreements and declarations that the companies have
violated anti-monopolization laws within the FTC Act.35 Successful
FTC cases produced orders stipulating that the generic and branded
parties will refrain from entering into similar agreements without the
consent of the FTC.36 At the state level, the California Department of
Justice recently achieved settlements in cases related to three
31. 15 U.S.C. § 18.
32. Id. § 45(a).
33. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 141 (2013) (reviewing an
11th Circuit decision that found a pay-for-delay settlement was “immune from antitrust attack so
long as its anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent”
(quoting Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th Cir. 2012), rev’d,
570 U.S. 136 (2013))).
34. See Pay-for-Delay: When Drug Companies Agree Not to Compete, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/mergers-competition/pay-delay (last visited
Oct. 4, 2020); see, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Allergan PLC, No. 17-cv-00312-WHO, 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 66042 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2017); Impax Laboratories, Inc., In the Matter of, FED.
TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/141-0004/impaxlaboratories-inc (last updated Aug. 2, 2019); Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and
Equitable Monetary Relief at 1, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 2:08-cv-02141-MSG
(E.D. Pa. June 17, 2015) [hereinafter Cephalon, Inc. Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction].
35. See, e.g., Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief at 2, 26–27, Fed. Trade
Comm’n v. Allergan PLC, No. 17-cv-00312-JCS (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2017); 15 U.S.C. § 53(b)
(“Whenever the Commission has reason to believe—(1) that any person, partnership, or corporation
is violating, or is about to violate, any provision of law enforced by the Federal Trade Commission,
and (2) that the enjoining thereof pending the issuance of a complaint by the Commission and until
such complaint is dismissed by the Commission or set aside by the court on review, or until the
order of the Commission made thereon has become final, would be in the interest of the public—
the Commission by any of its attorneys designated by it for such purpose may bring suit in a district
court of the United States to enjoin any such act or practice.”).
36. See, e.g., Cephalon, Inc. Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction, supra note 34, at 9.
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pharmaceutical companies. 37 These settlements enjoined the generic
and branded parties from entering into similar arrangements and
collected approximately $70 million in compensation for consumers.38
E. Federal Caselaw on Pay-For-Delay Settlements: Before and
After Actavis
Early challenges to pay-for-delay arrangements found some
success. In one such case, the Sixth Circuit found an arrangement
where a branded company expressly paid a generic rival not to enter
the market “a horizontal market allocation agreement and, as such . . .
per se illegal under the Sherman Act and under the corresponding
state antitrust laws.”39
In this instance, however, the court noted that the facts were
relatively straightforward.40 The “naked, horizontal restraint of trade,”
presumed to reduce competition and harm consumers, led the court to
find the settlement was per se illegal.41
The mid-2000s, however, saw appellate courts failing to
recognize the anticompetitive implications of pay-for-delay
arrangements.42 In a case where the branded company agreed to pay a
minimum of $60 million in licensing fees to a generic manufacturer to
keep the generic drug from the market, the Eleventh Circuit held that
there was no per se antitrust violation possible from this pay-for-delay
settlement.43 While recognizing the “effect of agreements that employ
extortion-type tactics to keep competitors from entering the market,”
the court found that “[i]n the context of patent litigation . . . the
anticompetitive effect may be no more broad than the patent’s own
exclusionary power.”44 The Eleventh Circuit was also concerned that
37. Press Release, State of Cal. Dep’t of Just., Off. of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General Becerra
Secures Nearly $70 Million Against Several Drug Companies for Delaying Competition and
Increasing Drug Prices (July 29, 2019), https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-generalbecerra-secures-nearly-70-million-against-several-drug [hereinafter Attorney General Becerra
Press Release] (at the state level, the California Department of Justice recently achieved settlements
in cases related to three pharmaceutical companies, Teva, Endo, and Teikoku).
38. Id.
39. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 900 (6th Cir. 2003).
40. Id. at 911.
41. Id.
42. Pay-for-Delay Study, supra note 1, at 1.
43. Schering-Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 402 F.3d 1056, 1060, 1065, 1076 (11th
Cir. 2005).
44. Id. at 1064.
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exposing “those agreements to antitrust liability would ‘obviously
chill such settlements.’”45
In the wake of this decision, other courts similarly subjected payfor-delay arrangements to lower levels of antitrust scrutiny.46 The
Second Circuit “decline[d] to conclude . . . that reverse payments are
per se violations of the Sherman Act . . . . [and] that the fact that the
patent holder is paying to protect its patent monopoly, without more,
establishes a Sherman Act violation.”47 The Federal Circuit similarly
found that a district court was correct in not presuming a pay-for-delay
arrangement to be per se unlawful, as “[o]nly agreements that have a
‘predictable and pernicious anticompetitive effect, and . . . limited
potential for procompetitive benefit’ are deemed to be per se
unlawful.”48 The court added that per se unlawfulness “is appropriate
‘[o]nce experience with a particular type of restraint enables the Court
to predict with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it.’”49
Courts during this era refused to see the clear anticompetitive effects
of branded monopolies paying off potential competitors. As a result,
during the six-year period from 2004 to 2009, pay-for-delay
settlements increased from zero per year to nineteen per year.50
Antitrust scrutiny increased with the Supreme Court’s 2013
Actavis decision. In Actavis, the Court reviewed an Eleventh Circuit
decision involving a pay-for-delay arrangement between generic
manufacturers Actavis and Paddock and branded drug manufacturer
Solvay.51 After Solvay acquired approval of a new branded drug in
2000, and a patent for its drug in 2003, Actavis and Paddock filed
ANDA certifications stating that Solvay’s patent was invalid and their
generics did not infringe.52 Following the typical pay-for-delay

45. Id. (quoting Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1309 (11th Cir.
2003)).
46. See Pay-for-Delay Study, supra note 1, at 1; see, e.g., In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust
Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006), abrogated by Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S.
136 (2013); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008),
abrogated by Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136 (2013).
47. In re Tamoxifen Citrate, 466 F.3d at 206.
48. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride, 544 F.3d at 1331–32 (alteration in original) (quoting
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997)).
49. Id. at 1332 (alterations in original) (quoting State Oil, 522 U.S. at 10).
50. Pay-for-Delay Study, supra note 1, at 1.
51. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 144–45.
52. Id. at 144.
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pattern, Solvay sued Actavis and Paddock.53 Actavis’s generic ANDA
application was approved and received first-to-file exclusivity.54
However, the parties settled Solvay’s suit in 2006.55 The terms of this
settlement required Actavis to “not bring its generic to market until
August 31, 2015, 65 months before Solvay’s patent expired (unless
someone else marketed a generic sooner).”56 The settlement also
required Actavis to promote Solvay’s branded drug.57 The other
generic drug parties agreed to similar obligations and delays.58 In
return, Actavis received $19 million to $30 million annually for nine
years from Solvay while the other generic companies received totals
between $12 million and $60 million.59
In its decision, the Eleventh Circuit found that pay-for-delay
settlements were “immune from antitrust attack so long as its
anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary
potential of the patent.”60 Reversing this decision, the Supreme Court
held that “reverse payment settlements such as the agreement alleged
in the complaint before us can sometimes violate the antitrust laws.”61
While allowing these actions to be brought, the Court did not find payfor-delay settlements per se illegal or raise the level of scrutiny beyond
a rule of reason analysis.62
A rule of reason analysis “requires a detailed and laborious
inquiry which is described by courts and commentators as complex
and burdensome on litigants and the judicial system.”63 In applying
the rule of reason to pay-for-delay arrangements, some courts have
followed a burden-shifting approach that requires plaintiffs to prove
that the generic “agreed to abstain from using the patented innovation”
and that there is an “unexplained payment” from the branded drug

53. Id. at 145.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 141 (quoting Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312
(11th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 570 U.S. 136 (2013)).
61. Id. (emphasis added).
62. Feldman & Misra, supra note 4, at 258.
63. Feldman, supra note 3, at 2107.
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company to the generic drug company.64 Finding an unexplained
payment requires:
(a) valuing any consideration flowing from the patentee to
the claimed infringer, which may be made over time and may
take forms other than cash; (b) deducting from that payment
the patent holder’s avoided litigation costs; and (c) deducting
from that payment the value of goods, services, or other
consideration provided by the claimed infringer to the patent
holder as part of the same transaction (or linked
transactions).65
If these calculations result in a positive sum, it supports a finding of
an unexplained payment that anticompetitively blocks the generic’s
entry.66
This calculation presents several challenges. First, difficult
calculations—including the estimation of payments versus litigation
costs—underpin the analysis.67 Parties seeking to maintain the
benefits of that pay-for-delay system also have the incentive to
complicate agreements to disguise the structure of payments.68
Additionally, assertion of privileges hinders external investigation of
the settlements.69 The rule of reason standard therefore presents a high
hurdle for enforcers seeking to challenge these arrangements.
F. Current Pay-For-Delay Arrangements: Growing Complexity
Despite the attention pay-for-delay settlements have gotten over
the past decade and post-Actavis antitrust scrutiny, the total number of

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Feldman & Misra, supra note 4, at 259; see also Edlin et al., supra note 4, at 17–18.
Edlin et al., supra note 4, at 18.
Id.
Feldman & Misra, supra note 4, at 260.
Id.
Id.
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settlements has continued to rise.70 During the 2015 fiscal year,
branded and generic drug companies filed a total of 170 settlements.71
Additionally, drug companies have used more complex
arrangements to avoid detection and evade liability.72 The FTC’s own
categorization of different pay-for-delay settlement forms has shifted
completely over the past decade.73 In the most recent FTC reports from
2013 to 2015, the FTC has included a category where the exchange
between the branded and generic companies only presents possible
compensation.74
Outside of the FTC’s classification, Professor Robin Feldman and
Research Fellow Prianka Misra identified their own “X category” that
consists of arrangements where generic entry is delayed but no
apparent value is exchanged.75 This category accounted for 74 percent
of settlements in 2015.76 In examining where the value to generics
might lie in such arrangements, Feldman and Misra analogize to the
FTC’s recent recognition of the anticompetitive potential of declining
royalty provisions in settlements.77 These provisions commit a generic
to paying royalties unless the branded company launches its own
generic.78 As with declining royalty provisions, there may be further
complex elements within opaque settlements that provide value to the
generics.79
Beyond questions of immediate value to the parties, a potential
anticompetitive threat in branded-generic settlements is the increased

70. See FED. TRADE COMM’N: BUREAU OF COMPETITION, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND
MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003 1 (2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/agr
eements-filed-federal-trade-commission-under-medicare-prescription-drug-improvementmodernization/overview_of_fy_2015_mma_agreements_0.pdf [hereinafter REPORT ON
AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION] (“Consistent with FY 2014, the
number of settlements potentially involving pay for delay continues to decrease significantly in the
wake of the Actavis decision, even though the total number of settlements filed with the FTC has
increased.”).
71. Id.
72. See Feldman & Misra, supra note 4, at 252–53.
73. Id. at 262–63.
74. Id. at 263; REPORT ON AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
supra note 70.
75. Feldman & Misra, supra note 4, at 264.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 265–66.
78. Id. at 265.
79. Id. at 265–66.
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prevalence of acceleration clauses, which allow the generic to hasten
entry based on conditions like the entry of an authorized generic or
another generic product.80 Such acceleration clauses were found in
approximately 76 percent of settlements in a recent year.81 While
greater generic entry typically encourages competition, acceleration
clauses instead discourage other generics from entering the market due
to the imminent entry of the generic that settled.82
In addition, the rise of biologic and biosimilar drugs presents
further challenges. Biologic drugs (such as Humira) are large,
complex-molecule drugs that are typically composed of hundreds of
atoms, in contrast to the small-molecule drugs (such as Nexium) that
are composed of less than one hundred atoms.83 Biologic drugs have
also been a key factor in rising drug costs.84 Biosimilar drugs, which
act as a lower-cost alternative to the branded biologic drugs, account
for a growing percentage of pharmaceutical industry revenue and
expenses. 85 Given the different regulations for biosimilars and the
growth of this sector, there is the potential that an increasing portion
of pay-for-delay settlements are going underreported as well.86 While
enforcers have attacked the more traditional cash-for-delay
settlements, clear challenges exist to discovering and policing new
forms of quid pro quo arrangements that keep cheaper generics from
the market.
G. Federal Pay-For-Delay Legislation Impasse
Recognizing these complexities and that “[c]ompetition among
drug makers is critical to lowering the price of prescription
80. Laura Karas et al., Pharmaceutical “Pay-for-Delay” Reexamined: A Dwindling Practice
or a Persistent Problem?, 71 HASTINGS L.J. 959, 965 (2020).
81. Id. at 966.
82. Id. at 965–66; see also Michael A. Carrier, Payment After Actavis, 100 IOWA L. REV. 7,
40–41 (2014).
83. See Small Molecules, Large Biologics and the Biosimilar Debate, ARIZ. BIOINDUST .
ASS’N, https://www.azbio.org/small-molecules-large-biologics-and-the-biosimilar-debate (last
visited Oct. 4, 2020).
84. Avik Roy, Biologic Medicines: The Biggest Driver of Rising Drug Prices, FORBES
(Mar. 8, 2019, 8:20 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2019/03/08/biologicmedicines-the-biggest-driver-of-rising-drug-prices/?sh=3eae873918b0 (“In 2017, according to
data from the IQVIA Institute, biologic drugs represented 2 percent of all U.S. prescriptions, but
37 percent of net drug spending. Since 2014, biologic drugs account for nearly all of the growth in
net drug spending: 93 percent of it, in fact.”).
85. Feldman & Misra, supra note 4, at 266–73.
86. Id. at 272.
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medications,” U.S. senators drafted legislation targeting pay-for-delay
arrangements.87 In January 2017, Senators Amy Klobuchar and Chuck
Grassley—members of the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust,
Competition Policy, and Consumer Rights—introduced bill S.124, the
Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act.88 The bill created a
presumption that agreements in which generic ANDA filers receive
“anything of value” are anticompetitive.89 The bill included an
exception if “the procompetitive benefits of the agreement outweigh
the anticompetitive effects of the agreement.”90
After S.124 failed to move past a referral to the Senate Judiciary
Committee, a similar bill was introduced in December 2018 as
S.3792—the Preserve Access to Affordable Generics and Biosimilars
Act.91 Apart from adding that biosimilars would be scrutinized along
with ANDA generics, the bill largely remained the same.92 Since its
introduction, no further action has been taken on this bill.
Additionally, no other state has adopted specific pay-for-delay
legislation, making California a bellwether for this issue.93
H. California State Legislation
1. Existing Antitrust Framework
In addition to the federal antitrust law, California attorneys
general have utilized state competition laws to target pay-for-delay
schemes. In their complaint against Teva Pharmaceutical Industries,
Cephalon, and Barr Laboratories, California Department of Justice
attorneys alleged both “restraint of trade in violation of the Cartwright
Act” and “violation of the Unfair Competition Law.”94
87. Samantha DiGrande, Klobuchar and Grassley Reintroduce Legislation to Address PayFor-Delay Tactics, AM. J. MANAGED CARE (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.centerforbiosimilars.co
m/news/klobuchar-and-grassley-reintroduce-legislation-to-address-payfordelay-tactics.
88. S.124, 115th Cong. (2017).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. S.3792, 115th Cong. (2018).
92. Id.
93. See Brenda Sandburg, California’s Pay-for-Delay Law May Be Harsher than FTC
Regulation, Could Face Legal Challenge, PINK SHEET (Oct. 8, 2019), https://pink.pharmaintellig
ence.informa.com/PS140981/Californias-PayForDelay-Law-May-Be-Harsher-Than-FTCRegulation-Could-Face-Legal-Challenge.
94. Complaint at 24, 26, California v. Teva Pharm. Indus., Ltd., No. 2:19-cv-03281-MSG
(E.D. Pa. July 29, 2019).
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The Cartwright Act, California’s principal antitrust law, prohibits
the “combination of capital, skill or acts” to “create or carry out
restrictions in trade or commerce” and other forms of anticompetitive
behavior.95 The Unfair Competition Law prohibits “unfair
competition” including “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business
act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading
advertising.”96 To show that a business act is “unfair,” plaintiffs “must
show the conduct ‘threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law,
or violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws because its effects
are comparable to or the same as a violation of the law, or otherwise
significantly threatens or harms competition.’”97
Both of these create private and public causes of action, and their
existence is noted in the text of AB 824.98 However, the lack of an
explicit definition for which acts are anticompetitive and implicate
antitrust law creates the potential for anticompetitive behavior to slip
by unchallenged.
2. AB 824 Legislative Process
Currently, no state legislature has specifically targeted pay-fordelay arrangements.99 In February 2019, State Assembly member Jim
Wood introduced his Preserving Access to Affordable Drugs AB 824
in partnership with Attorney General Xavier Becerra.100 On March 27,

95. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16720 (Deering 2020).
96. Id. § 17200.
97. Byars v. SCME Mortg. Bankers, Inc., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 796, 804–05 (Ct. App. 2003)
(quoting Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 973 P.2d 527, 544 (Cal. 1999)).
98. Assemb. B. 824, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (“The Cartwright Act makes every
trust, subject to specified exemptions, unlawful, against public policy, and void and defines ‘trust’
for purposes of the act as a combination of capital, skill, or acts by 2 or more persons, defined as
corporations, firms, partnerships, and associations, for certain designated purposes. Under existing
law, these purposes include creating or carrying out restrictions in trade or commerce or preventing
competition in manufacturing, marketing, transportation, sale, or purchase of merchandise,
produce, or any commodity. The Unfair Practices Act makes certain business practices unlawful,
including unfair competition. Under existing law, unfair competition is defined to include an
unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice, unfair, deceptive, untrue, or misleading
advertising, and any false representations to the public.”).
99. Melody Gutierrez, California Could Be First State to Bar Drug Makers from Paying
Competitors to Delay Release, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2019, 4:10 PM), https://www.latimes.com/p
olitics/la-pol-ca-drug-companies-pay-for-delay-generic-phama-20190220-story.html.
100. See CAL. ASSEMB., HISTORY OF ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 824, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2019); Press Release, Assemblymember Jim Wood, Assemblymember Wood and Attorney General
Becerra Announce Bill to Outlaw “Pay for Delay” Tactics of Drug Companies (Feb. 20, 2019),
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2019, AB 824 was unanimously passed by the Assembly Health
Committee.101 In the Assembly Judiciary Committee, the bill was
passed after amendments that: 1) clarified “the penalty received by the
State does not exceed the amount attributable to the violation based on
California’s share of the market, or $20 million, whichever is greater,”
and 2) “ensure[d] . . . the State does not receive penalties twice for the
same infraction (i.e. through both the provisions of this bill and
through other existing California antitrust laws).”102 During review by
the Appropriations Committee, the bill was amended to modify the
standard to require parties to prove they are not in violation by a
“preponderance of the evidence” rather than “clear and convincing
evidence.”103 The bill was then passed as amended by the
Assembly.104
The Senate Judiciary Committee made two major amendments.
First, it created a statute of limitations—an action must be brought
within four years of the cause of action accruing.105 Second, the
Judiciary Committee added two additional carve-outs to section
134002(d), which outlines settlements that are not prohibited by the
bill.106 The first carve-out allows for “compensation for saved
reasonable future litigation expenses of the reference drug holder”
where the drugholder’s documented and adopted budgets reflect this
https://a02.asmdc.org/press-releases/20190220-assemblymember-wood-and-attorney-generalbecerra-announce-bill-outlaw-pay [hereinafter Assemblymember Jim Wood Press Release].
101. HISTORY OF ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 824.
102. ASSEMB. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 824, 2019–2020 Reg.
Sess., at 6 (Cal. 2019) (as amended in Assembly, Apr. 9, 2019); Assemb. B. 824 (adding “up to . . .
twenty million dollars . . . whichever is greater” and “[i]f the State of California is awarded penalties
under subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1), it may not recover penalties pursuant to another law
identified in paragraph (2). This section shall not be construed to foreclose the State of California’s
ability to claim any relief or damages available in paragraph (2), other than those that are
penalties”).
103. Compare ASSEMB. COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 824,
2019–2020 Reg. Sess., at 2 (Cal. 2019) (“Specifically, under the bill these types of settlements in
pharmaceutical patent infringement cases are presumed to be anticompetitive unless
procompetitive effects can be clearly and convincingly demonstrated.”), with CAL. ASSEMB.,
ASSEMBLY THIRD READING OF ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 824, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess., at 1 (Cal. 2019)
(replacing “clear and convincing” with “a preponderance of the” evidence).
104. See HISTORY OF ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 824.
105. S. COMM. ON HEALTH, ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 824, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess., at
4 (Cal. 2019) (as amended in Senate, June 17, 2019); Assemb. B. 824 (“An action to enforce a
cause of action for a violation of this section shall be commenced within four years after the cause
of action accrued.”).
106. Assemb. B. 824.
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compensation, and the compensation does not exceed $7.5 million or
“five percent of the revenue that the nonreference drug holder
projected or forecasted it would receive in the first three years of sales
of its version of the reference drug documented at least 12 months
before the settlement.”107 The second carve-out allows for
An agreement resolving or settling a patent infringement
claim that permits a nonreference drug filer to begin selling,
offering for sale, or distributing the nonreference drug
product if the reference drug holder seeks approval to launch,
obtains approval to launch, or launches a different dosage,
strength, or form of the reference drug having the same active
ingredient before the date set by the agreement for entry of
the nonreference drug filer.108
The Senate further modified these 134002(d) carve-outs in its
July 11, 2019 text.109 Rather than defining these carve-outs as
exceptions to the general prohibition created by the bill, the July senate
amendment listed these carve-outs as limitations on what the bill
construed as “anything of value.”110 This July 11 amendment further
clarified who may bring suit, stating that a violation penalty “is
recoverable only in a civil action brought by the Attorney General”
and that a penalty “shall accrue only to the State of California and shall
be recovered in a civil action brought by the Attorney General.”111 The
final Senate revision on September 4, 2019, modified what a party
must show to succeed on its claim.112 Previously, a party was required
to show that its agreement “directly generated procompetitive benefits
that could not be achieved by less restrictive means” that “outweigh
the anticompetitive effects of the agreement.”113 The “less restrictive
means” language was removed, so a party is now only required to

107. Id.
108. Id.
109. S. JUDICIARY COMM., ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 824, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess., at
6 (Cal. 2019) (as amended in Senate, July 11, 2019).
110. Id.
111. Assemb. B. 824; see S. JUDICIARY COMM., ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 824, at 6.
112. S. RULES COMM., ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 824, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess., at 4–5
(Cal. 2019) (as amended in Senate, Sept. 4, 2019).
113. S. JUDICIARY COMM., ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 824, at 4 (as amended in Senate,
July 11, 2019) (emphasis added).
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show that the agreement “directly generated procompetitive benefits”
that “outweigh the anticompetitive effects of the agreement.”114
The bill was passed as amended in the senate on September 11,
referred to the Assembly, and enrolled on September 24, 2019.115 The
bill was approved by the governor on October 7, 2019, and chaptered
in Chapter 531.116
3. Provisions of AB 824
This legislation empowers the California Attorney General to
bring a civil suit and recover penalties against “any party to an
agreement that violates this section.”117 It further allows for the
presumption of anticompetitive behavior when a “nonreference drug
filer” (defined in the bill as an ANDA generic filer or biosimilar
manufacturer) “receives anything of value from another company
asserting patent infringement, including, but not limited to, an
exclusive license or a promise that the brand company will not launch
an authorized generic version of its brand drug” and “agrees to limit
or forego research, development, manufacturing, marketing, or sales
of the nonreference drug filer’s product for any period of time.”118
Establishing the above creates a presumption of illegal
anticompetitive behavior that parties may rebut by showing by a
preponderance of the evidence that either: “[t]he value received by the
nonreference drug filer . . . is a fair and reasonable compensation
solely for other goods or services that the nonreference drug filer has
promised to provide” or that the “agreement has directly generated
procompetitive benefits and the procompetitive benefits of the
agreement outweigh the anticompetitive effects of the agreement.”119
While “anything of value” is a broad term, the text carves out six
settlement considerations that do not constitute something of value for
114. S. RULES COMM., ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 824, at 4 (as amended in Senate,
Sept. 4, 2019).
115. CAL. ASSEMB., HISTORY OF ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 824, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
116. Id.; see Act of Oct. 7, 2019, ch. 531, 2019 Cal. Legis. Serv. (West) (to be codified as CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 13400–134002). Subsequent references to the Act will be to CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE sections.
117. Act of Oct. 7, 2019 § 134002(e)(1)(B) (“Any penalty described in subparagraph (A) shall
accrue only to the State of California and shall be recovered in a civil action brought by the Attorney
General in its own name, or by any of its attorneys designated by it for that purpose, against any
party to an agreement that violates this section.”).
118. Id. § 134002(a)(1)(A)–(B).
119. Id. § 134002(a)(3).
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the purposes of the bill:120 First, “the right to market the competing
product in the United States before the expiration of either: . . . [a]
patent that is the basis for the patent infringement claim” or a “patent
right or other statutory exclusivity that would prevent the marketing
of the drug.”121 Second, “[a] covenant not to sue on a claim that the
nonreference drug product infringes a United States patent.”122 Third,
“[c]ompensation for saved reasonable future litigation expenses of the
reference drug holder.”123 This compensation must be “reflected in
budgets that the reference drug holder documented and adopted at
least six months before the settlement” and be less than or equal to the
lower of $7.5 million or “five percent of the revenue that the
nonreference drug holder projected or forecasted it would receive in
the first three years of sales of its version of the reference drug
documented at least 12 months before the settlement.”124 Fourth,
settlements that allow nonreference drug filers (generics and
biosimilars) to sell or distribute their nonreference drugs when the
reference drug holder (branded company) seeks approval for or
launches a “different dosage, strength, or form of the reference drug
having the same active ingredient before the date set by the agreement
for entry of the nonreference drug filer.”125 The bill text, however,
notes that authorized generic versions of the reference drug do not
constitute a “different form” for the purpose of this subsection.126
Fifth, a branded drug company’s agreements either to facilitate or to
not interfere with the “nonreference drug filer’s ability to secure and
maintain regulatory approval to market the nonreference drug
product.”127 Finally, settlements in which the branded company
“forgives the potential damages accrued by a nonreference drug holder
for an at-risk launch of the nonreference drug product that is the
subject of that claim.”128

120. Id. § 134002(a)(2)(A)–(F).
121. Id. § 134002(a)(2)(A).
122. Id. § 134002(a)(2)(B).
123. Id. § 134002(a)(2)(C).
124. Id. This subsection also notes that “[i]f no projections or forecasts are available, the
compensation [must] not exceed two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000).”
125. Id. § 134002(a)(2)(D).
126. Id.
127. Id. § 134002(a)(2)(E).
128. Id. § 134002(a)(2)(F).
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4. Support and Opposition for AB 824
Over the course of its development, key interest groups supported
and opposed AB 824. Attorney General Xavier Becerra, at a time
when the California Department of Justice emphasized its settlements
against pay-for-delay arrangements, supported the bill.129 There was
also general support for the bill among business associations,
healthcare advocacy groups, and public interest organizations.
Consumer Reports said that “AB 824 will make it easier to stop these
[anticompetitive] schemes in their tracks.”130 Small Business Majority
supported AB 824, noting that “[c]ontrolling prescription drug prices
and ensuring competition, and thus controlling overall healthcare
expenses, helps ensure small business owners have access to
affordable, quality healthcare options.”131 California Health+
Advocates, a community health center advocacy group, supported AB
824 as a policy that “reduces pharmaceutical costs for patients in
California.”132 Health Access, a healthcare consumer advocacy group,
said that AB 824 allowed California to prevent the “problematic,
price-gouging practice of pay-for-delay by the prescription drug
companies.”133 Other groups supporting the bill included AARP
California, California Labor Federation, California Public Interest
Research Group, Kaiser Permanente, and the Western Center on Law
& Poverty, Inc.134
The Association for Accessible Medicines, a trade association for
generic drug manufacturers, opposed AB 824 because of concerns that
it might penalize procompetitive settlements and its belief that Actavis
represented a sufficient federal framework for antitrust scrutiny.135
Other trade associations expressed similar fears and voiced
conditional opposition. Biocom, a biotechnology trade association,
129. Attorney General Becerra Press Release, supra note 37.
130. ASSEMB. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL NO . 824, 2019–2020
Reg. Sess., at 14 (Cal. 2019) (hearing Apr. 9, 2019).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Press Release, Health Access, CA Consumers Could Save Millions Under Bills Up in
Assembly Health Committee Tuesday (Mar. 25, 2019), https://health-access.org/press_release/
2019/03/ca-consumers-could-save-millions-under-bills-up-in-assembly-health-committeetuesday/.
134. ASSEMB. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 824, at 16
(hearing Apr. 9, 2019).
135. Id. at 15–16.
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was also concerned that the “bill usurps jurisdiction of finding and
prosecuting of anti-competitive behavior from the [FTC] and inserts
the State of California into this role.”136 Biocom further noted that two
provisions—the initial presumption and private right of action—
would chill generic entry into the market.137 The pharmaceutical trade
association Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
likewise sought amendments to: (1) “modify the scope to only include
patent infringement claims”; (2) “allow the factfinder to make
appropriate determinations based on the circumstances of the case”;
and (3) remove the private right of action.138 These conditions were
partially reflected in senate revisions of the bill, which eliminated the
private right of action and lowered the requirements that parties must
show.139
III. ANALYSIS
A. Intent of AB 824
The intent of AB 824 is fairly straightforward. From its title, the
law’s purpose is to “preserv[e] access to affordable drugs” by
prohibiting anticompetitive settlements that raise costs for patients.140
In a public statement when the bill was introduced, Assembly member
Wood said:
Who loses [as a result of pay-for-delay arrangements]? The
patients who deserve access to less expensive drugs and all
of us who end up paying more for health care and, in turn,
health care premiums. Affordability is a huge issue in health
care, and this calculating practice makes it worse and we
need to stop it.141

136. S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 824, 2019–2020 Reg.
Sess., at 13 (Cal. 2019) (hearing July 9, 2019).
137. Id.
138. CAL. ASSEMB., ASSEMBLY THIRD READING OF ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 824, 2019–2020
Reg. Sess., at 2 (Cal. 2019) (as amended May 16, 2019).
139. S. COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 824, 2019–2020 Reg.
Sess., at 1 (Cal. 2019) (as amended in Senate, July 11, 2019); S. RULES COMM., ANALYSIS OF
ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 824, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess., at 2–6 (Cal. 2019) (as amended in Senate, Sept. 4,
2019).
140. Act of Oct. 7, 2019, ch. 531, 2019 Cal. Legis. Serv. (West) (to be codified as CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE §§ 13400–134002).
141. Assemblymember Jim Wood Press Release, supra note 100.
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Attorney General Becerra added that “[t]his legislation
is a crucial step in combating predatory pricing practices, like ‘payfor-delay’ schemes, by drug companies and in defending access to
affordable care.”142
B. Efficacy of AB 824
The intent of the legislation is relatively clear. The larger question
is whether AB 824 can achieve its goals of lowering pharmaceutical
costs and preserving affordable drugs for patients. This efficacy
analysis requires examining: (1) the expansion and limitations placed
on antitrust enforcement by the law’s text and amendments; (2) the
ability of the law to prohibit the variety of anticompetitive settlements;
(3) whether the law might survive a nascent challenge; and (4) whether
AB 824 is an effective mechanism for addressing high drug costs for
patients.
1. Expansion and Limits of Antitrust Enforcement Created by AB
824
The main expansion of AB 824 is clear. It shifts the burden from
enforcers to the branded and generic companies, requiring them to
prove that their settlement is not anticompetitive. Practically, this
lowers the barrier to what the Attorney General must prove to obtain
penalties against such anticompetitive behavior. Rather than requiring
the Attorney General to build large cases showing collusion between
companies, the burden now falls on branded and generic drug
companies to show that their behavior is not harmful. Furthermore,
AB 824 makes it more difficult for judges to approve pay-for-delay
arrangements. As antitrust practitioners have noted, some judges have
been “erod[ing]” enforcement of federal antitrust laws since the
1970s.143 While judges may still rule in favor of an anticompetitive
pay-for-delay arrangement, this legislation creates additional hurdles.
However, this law is not a blunt prohibition on all settlements
between branded and generic drug manufacturers. It places key
limitations on actions against these parties. Only the California
142. Id.
143. John Newman, What Democratic Contenders Are Missing in the Race to Revive Antitrust,
THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/04/what-2020democratic-candidates-miss-about-antitrust/586135/.
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Attorney General—not private parties or the United States Department
of Justice or FTC—may seek remedies under this law.144 Additionally,
although it shifts the burden, it allows for numerous exceptions. It
limits “anything of value” to exclude certain scenarios involving
agreements related to: the right to market, covenants to not sue,
compensation for branded company’s future litigation expenses, the
branded company’s new form or dosage of the reference drug,
regulatory approval for the generic drug, and forgiveness of potential
damages.145
The bill also allows companies to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the settlement either offers procompetitive benefits
that outweigh the anticompetitive harms or is “fair and reasonable
compensation solely for other goods or services that the nonreference
drug filer has promised to provide.”146 While branded and generic
drug companies were concerned that it would prevent procompetitive
settlements, the exceptions to “anything of value” and ways to
disprove liability show that this legislation is not overly broad.
2. AB 824’s Ability to Capture Increasingly Complex Pay-ForDelay Settlements
While not being overly broad, AB 824 raises the question of
whether—with all of its carveouts—it can still prohibit the intended
anticompetitive pay-for-delay schemes. While the FTC in 2016
celebrated a decline in traditional compensation pay-for-delay
arrangements post-Actavis, they have also reported settlements where
the arrangements present potential compensation.147 Beyond the
FTC’s detection of such potential pay-for-delay settlements, scholars
144. Act of Oct. 7, 2019 § 134002(e)(1)(B) (“Any penalty described in subparagraph (A) shall
accrue only to the State of California and shall be recovered in a civil action brought by the Attorney
General in its own name, or by any of its attorneys designated by it for that purpose, against any
party to an agreement that violates this section.”).
145. Id. § 134002(a)(2).
146. Id. § 134002(a)(3)(A).
147. Feldman & Misra, supra note 4, at 249, 261–62 (“FTC reports and commentary suggest
that the agency may have ‘finally started to turn the corner on the issue.’ In a [2016] FTC blog, for
example, the FTC concluded that although more settlements between brand-name companies and
generics occurred than in any previous year, pharmaceutical companies managed to settle without
“any compensation” to the generic company 80 percent of the time.”); Jamie Towey & Brad Albert,
Is FTC v. Actavis Causing Pharma Companies to Change Their Behavior?, FED. TRADE
COMM’N (Jan. 13, 2016, 1:00 PM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/competitionmatters/2016/01/ftc-v-actavis-causing-pharma-companies-change-their.
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have also noted that 74 percent of settlements between branded and
generic parties in 2015 delayed generic entry but exchanged no
discernible value.148 This raises the specter that branded and generic
drug companies are simply creating more complex pay-for-delay
arrangements.
AB 824 only prohibits the exchange of “anything of value” and
excludes several considerations from being considered something of
value.149 Some of these exclusions, including considerations of
noninterference with regulatory approval and the branded drug
company’s forgiveness of potential damages, which were added in the
senate following drug company requests, could provide vehicles for
key exchanges that are now deemed not of value.150
The focus on the exchange itself rather than the resulting
restrictions on entry is understandable given courts’ concern about
whether these settlements represent parties’ fair estimations of patent
value or a monopolistic toll. However, as scholars surveying the payfor-delay landscape have suggested, this analysis does not account for
settlement items such as acceleration clauses that still present
anticompetitive harms.151 Some scholars have suggested that a better
framework would be to examine the “existence of a restriction on
generic entry . . . in light of the strength of the category of patent in
question.”152 Using a different methodology, Professor Michael
Carrier offered a test that analyzes “whether the brand has conveyed
to the generic a type of consideration not available as a direct
consequence of winning the lawsuit.”153 These restriction-based and
consideration-based approaches cast a wider net for anticompetitive
arrangements while preserving parties’ ability to settle. AB 824’s
focus on payments, instead, may prove insufficient to capture the
different harms to competition posed by these settlements.
These limitations lessen the legislation’s efficacy in scrutinizing
an industry that has already made adjustments to their quid pro quo
arrangements. Furthermore, given the decade it took to pass any payfor-delay legislation, it is unlikely that legislators would pass new bills
adapting to new forms of pay-for-delay arrangements. The danger of
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Feldman & Misra, supra note 4, at 264.
Act of Oct. 7, 2019 § 134002(a)(1)–(2).
Id. § 134002(a)(2).
Karas et al., supra note 80, at 965; Carrier, supra note 82, at 40–41.
Karas et al., supra note 80, at 968.
Carrier, supra note 82, at 26.
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pay-for-delay mutations means that this more static legislation could
calcify into only creating liability for traditional pay-for-delay models
that most branded and generic companies would avoid.
Although loopholes remain an issue, AB 824 still has the potential
to limit pay-for-delay costs on consumers. The burden shift to
companies from a more lenient rule of reason standard is a significant
step forward. While Actavis reopened the door for antitrust scrutiny,
agencies still need to satisfy a rule of reason analysis that is “complex
and burdensome on litigants and the judicial system.”154 AB 824
instead simply requires antitrust enforcers to show the exchange of
something of value between branded drug companies and generic
manufacturers and the delayed entry of the generic drug. This relieves
agencies of expending significant resources on what should be
straightforward cases and allows for a cleaner analysis for courts that
misunderstand anticompetitive harms.
In addition, the pharmaceutical industry’s challenge of the bill
suggests that it has a role to play in prohibiting pay-for-delay
agreements. Following the passage of AB 824, the general counsel for
Association for Accessible Medicines (AAM), a generic drug trade
association, said that “most settlements have a provision that would
trigger anticompetitive presumption” and referenced an “acceleration
clause whereby if another generic manufacturer launches its product,
the party to the settlement can market its generic at the same time.”155
Despite the fact that AB 824 allows companies to dispute the
presumption, AAM worried that this would “trigger the ‘anything of
value’ provision” and create an anticompetitive presumption.156 The
industry’s concern about the legislation’s potential application to
many settlements suggests that it may be effective in discouraging
anticompetitive pay-for-delay arrangements.
Finally, this legislation allows for scrutiny of generic versions of
small-molecule branded drugs and large-molecule biologic drugs.
Biologic drugs and their biosimilar generic versions represent a
growing percentage of the pharmaceutical industry.157 This
legislation’s decision to use “nonreference drug filer,” “nonreference
drug product,” “reference drug holder,” and “reference drug product”
154.
155.
156.
157.

Feldman, supra note 3, at 2107.
Sandburg, supra note 93.
Id.
Feldman & Misra, supra note 4, at 266–67.

(13) 54.1_WALLENTINE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

ANALYZING EFFECTS OF CALIFORNIA’S AB 824

2/25/21 6:01 PM

393

rather than the simpler “generic” and “brand” distinction reflects the
same recognition that the federal Preserve Access to Affordable
Generics and Biosimilars Act made—biosimilars and biologics are
subject to the same incentives as ANDA and branded small molecule
drugs.158 This inclusion allows the Attorney General to police this
growing marketplace in the same fashion as the traditional small
molecule market.
3. Dormant Commerce Clause Challenge
In November 2019, the AAM filed suit in the Eastern District of
California against Attorney General Becerra to block enforcement of
this legislation.159 It primarily alleges federal constitutional claims: a
dormant commerce clause claim, a preemption claim, and an
excessive fine Eighth Amendment claim.160 Examining AAM’s claim
is useful in both understanding challenges to this specific legislation
and for highlighting potential tension between state antitrust
legislation and federalist principles.
In its dormant commerce clause claim, AAM alleges that the
legislation violates the clause because it contains no geographic
limitations on the patent settlements to which it applies.161 Citing
Healy v. Beer Institute,162 AAM suggests that when a state law in
effect regulates “commerce occurring wholly outside [the] State’s
borders,” it will be “struck down under the Commerce Clause
‘whether or not the regulated commerce has effects within the
state.’”163 While noting that “AB 824 does not expressly refer to outof-state commerce,” AAM states that the Supreme Court has held that
the fact that state legislation “is addressed only to” conduct “in [the

158. Act of Oct. 7, 2019, ch. 531, § 134000, 2019 Cal. Legis. Serv. (West); S.3792, 115th Cong.
(2018).
159. See Complaint at 1, Ass’n for Accessible Meds. v. Becerra, No. 2:19-cv-02281-TLN-DB
(E.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2019) [hereinafter AAM Complaint].
160. Id. at 30–46.
161. Id. at 31–32 (“AB 824 extends to commerce (namely, patent settlements) negotiated,
signed, and entered wholly outside the borders of California. AB 824 contains no restrictions that
would limit its application to settlement agreements between California entities, and no restrictions
that would limit its application to settlement agreements that were negotiated, completed, or entered
in California.”).
162. 491 U.S. 324 (1989).
163. See AAM Complaint, supra note 159, at 31 (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted)
(quoting Healy, 491 U.S. at 335–36).
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state] is irrelevant if the ‘practical effect’” is to regulate conduct “in
other States.”164
However, dormant commerce clause based reviews of state
legislation affecting external transactions have been more lenient than
AAM’s discussion suggests. Dormant commerce clause reviews of
state statutes frequently apply the flexible Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc.165 balancing test that states, “[w]here the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects
on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to
the putative local benefits.”166 Other courts have formulated the test as
requiring the examination of:
(1) whether the challenged statute regulates evenhandedly
with only “incidental” effects on interstate commerce, or
discriminates against interstate commerce either on its face
or in practical effect;
(2) whether the statute serves a legitimate local purpose; and,
if so,
(3) whether alternative means could promote this local
purpose as well without discriminating against interstate
commerce.167
A key element of the Pike test is the “evenhandedness” with
which the statute regulates. Some courts have held that if a statute
affects both in-state and out-of-state transactions relatively equally,
the dormant commerce clause is likely not implicated, and it is
unnecessary to even apply the Pike test.168 In the case of AB 824, there
is no disparity between the legislation’s treatment of in-state and outof-state actors. The legislation’s text does not single out California
pharmaceutical firms or out-of-state pharmaceutical firms in terms of

164. Id. at 32 (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Brown-Forman Distillers
Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986)).
165. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
166. Id. at 142.
167. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979) (citing Pike, 397 U.S. at 142).
168. Chinatown Neighborhood Ass’n v. Harris, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1101 (N.D. Cal. 2014),
aff’d, 794 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[W]here, as here, there is no discrimination and there is no
significant burden on interstate commerce, we need not examine the actual or putative benefits of
the challenged statutes.” (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Optometrists & Opticians v. Harris, 682 F.3d
1144, 1155 (2012))).
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enforcement.169 Nor does it include exceptions that only apply to instate firms.170 While enforcement actions may reveal the legislation’s
disparate impact on in-state and out-of-state firms, at present the
statute appears to apply evenhandedly towards both designations.
Even applying the Pike test, it still provides a fairly lenient
standard. A court must find that “the burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits.”171 The Ninth Circuit has taken this to mean that “[f]or a
facially neutral statute to violate the commerce clause, the burdens of
the statute must so outweigh the putative benefits as to make the
statute unreasonable or irrational.”172 “Such is the case,” the court
noted, “where the asserted benefits of the statute are in fact illusory or
relate to goals that evidence an impermissible favoritism of in-state
industry over out-of-state industry.”173 In examining a city ordinance
that required contractors to provide benefits to employees with
registered domestic partners, the Ninth Circuit noted that “[w]hile we
do not require a dollar estimate of the effect the Ordinance will have,
we do require specific details as to how the costs of the Ordinance
burdened interstate commerce.”174 It further clarified that “[t]he
Commerce Clause is concerned with the free flow of goods and
services through the several states; it is the economic interest in being
free from trade barriers that the clause protects.”175 This suggests that
the Ninth Circuit believes the primary function of the dormant
commerce clause to be preventing state-against-state protectionism
and trade barriers, not to necessarily prohibit states from regulating all
transactions that have an effect on their citizens but involve some outof-state elements.
AAM alternately suggests a broader dormant commerce clause
basis for striking down state laws that affect out-of-state firms. It cites
Healy as holding that the Court will strike down state laws regulating
“commerce occurring wholly outside [the] State’s borders,” regardless
169. See Act of Oct. 7, 2019, ch. 531, 2019 Cal. Legis. Serv. (West) (omitting explicit
references to California-based firms or externally-based firms).
170. See id. (omitting language that restricts application to California firms exclusively).
171. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (citing Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440,
443 (1960)).
172. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. City of Long Beach, 951 F.2d 977, 983 (9th Cir. 1991).
173. Id.
174. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. City and Cnty. of S.F., 253 F.3d 461, 471 (9th Cir. 2001).
175. Id.
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of whether the regulated commerce has in-state effects.176 AAM also
cites Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor
Authority177 as holding that legislation’s direction at intrastate
commerce is irrelevant if the “practical effect” of the legislation is to
regulate external commerce.178
However, other courts have found Healy and Brown-Forman
Distillers to be narrower than AAM’s hoped-for rule. The Tenth
Circuit noted that in these cases, “the Court . . . faced (1) a price
control or price affirmation regulation, (2) linking in-state prices to
those charged elsewhere, with (3) the effect of raising costs for out-ofstate consumers or rival businesses.”179 The Court itself appears to
emphasize the central dormant commerce clause rule in Healy: “States
may not deprive businesses and consumers in other States of
‘whatever competitive advantages they may possess’ based on the
conditions of the local market.”180
In sum, the principal purpose of the dormant commerce clause
appears to be preventing protectionism between the states; review of
a potential dormant commerce clause frequently involves the fairly
lenient Pike balancing test that favors upholding state laws; and
courts’ analyses tend to focus on whether states are erecting trade
barriers to favor their own industries. While the Pike test does allow
for court discretion in balancing the factors, the lack of protectionist
tendencies in this legislation suggests it is unlikely to implicate the
dormant commerce clause.
4. Preemption Challenge
In its preemption claim, AAM argues that the barriers to
settlement imposed by AB 824 undermine “not only the rights that
federal patent law confers, but also the timely entry of lower-priced
generic medicines onto the market.”181 Generally, the Supreme Court
has found conflict preemption occurs “where ‘compliance with both
state and federal law is impossible,’ or where ‘the state law “stands as
176. AAM Complaint, supra note 159, at 31 (alteration in original) (quoting Healy v. Beer Inst.,
492 U.S. 324, 332 (1989)).
177. 476 U.S. 573 (1986).
178. AAM Complaint, supra note 159, at 31 (quoting Healy, 492 U.S. at 336).
179. Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1173 (10th Cir. 2015).
180. Healy, 492 U.S. at 339 (quoting Brown-Forman Distillers, 476 U.S. at 580).
181. AAM Complaint, supra note 159, at 41.
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an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress.”’”182 A cursory look might thus suggest
this legislation would be preempted. This legislation attempts to curb
the pay-for-delay results of the Hatch-Waxman’s ANDA process. It
interacts with patents that branded drug companies own. And scholars
have suggested that similar state patent legislation—statutes that
prohibit patent trolling—may indeed be preempted.183 Upon closer
inspection, however, AB 824 does not impede the underlying goals of
patent laws or the Hatch-Waxman Act.184
In Wyeth v. Levine,185 the Court outlined the “two cornerstones of
our pre-emption jurisprudence.”186 “First, ‘the purpose of Congress is
the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.’”187 “Second, ‘[i]n
all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in which Congress has
“legislated . . . in a field which the States have traditionally
occupied,” . . . we “start with the assumption that the historic
police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal
Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”’”188
The congressional purpose underlying the Hatch-Waxman Act
was to “make available more low cost generic drugs by establishing a
generic drug approval procedure for pioneer drugs first approved after
1962.”189 Representative Henry Waxman, one of its drafters,
described it as “an early attempt to address the problem of prescription
drug prices by encouraging competition against brand-name drugs
from generic drug manufacturers.”190 Its ANDA process is merely a
means to the ends, not the ends in itself. In an amicus brief clarifying
the policy behind Hatch-Waxman, Representative Waxman
182. Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 575 U.S. 373, 377 (2015) (quoting California v. ARC Am.
Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100–01 (1989)).
183. Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Trolls and Preemption, 101 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1583 (2015).
184. This analysis was aided by the amicus brief filed by Professor Michael Carrier in the case’s
Ninth Circuit appeal. See generally Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellee’s Answering Brief,
Ass’n for Accessible Meds. v. Becerra, No. 20-15014, 2020 WL 4251776 (9th Cir. July 24, 2020)
[hereinafter Professor Michael Carrier Amicus Curiae Brief].
185. 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
186. Id. at 565.
187. Id. (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).
188. Id. (quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485).
189. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647.
190. Motion and Brief of Representative Henry A. Waxman as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 3, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Schering-Plough Corp., 548 U.S. 919 (2006) (No. 05-273),
2005 WL 2462026, at *3.

(13) 54.1_WALLENTINE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

398

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

2/25/21 6:01 PM

[Vol. 54:367

commented that “[a]greeing with smaller rivals to delay or limit
competition is an abuse of the Hatch-Waxman law that was intended
to promote genetic alternatives.”191 He further noted that, “[b]y
subjecting [pay-for-delay settlements] to stringent governmental
scrutiny and providing an additional penalty if they were found to
violate the antitrust laws, the 2003 [Medicare Drug Benefit
Legislation] underscored that the Hatch-Waxman Act was never
intended to foster such anti-competitive arrangements.”192
Like the Hatch-Waxman Act’s goal of ensuring low-cost generic
availability, AB 824 aims to make necessary drugs affordable to
California patients. In method, it similarly leverages market
competition to drive down drug prices. As AB 824 does not diverge
from the objectives laid out by Hatch-Waxman’s drafters and instead
attempts to ameliorate the anticompetitive side effects of the ANDA
process, its purpose mirrors Congress’s purpose. Given the primacy of
congressional intent in preemption analysis, it is therefore not likely
to be preempted by the Hatch-Waxman Act.
In examining the potential preemption of AB 824 by federal
patent law, Professor Michael Carrier emphasizes that the Court has
rejected the “absolutist” approach that prohibits antitrust scrutiny of
patent disputes.193 In Actavis, the Court noted that a patent’s
exclusionary potential does not “immunize the agreement from
antitrust attack.”194 Looking at precedent, the Court found that
“patent-related settlement agreements can sometimes violate the
antitrust laws.”195 The Court also noted the variety of outcomes in
patent disputes—patent holders are only permitted to enforce their
monopoly when their patent is found to be valid and infringed.196
Instead of following the Eleventh Circuit’s immunization of
companies based on one party’s assertion that its patent was valid and
infringed, the Court found that “a court, by examining the size of the
payment, may well be able to assess its likely anticompetitive effects
along with its potential justifications without litigating the validity of
the patent; and parties may well find ways to settle patent disputes
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. at *7.
Id. at *10.
Professor Michael Carrier Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 184, at 15.
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 147 (2013).
Id. at 149.
Id. at 147.

(13) 54.1_WALLENTINE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

ANALYZING EFFECTS OF CALIFORNIA’S AB 824

2/25/21 6:01 PM

399

without the use of reverse payments.”197 Accordingly, the Court
opposed determining “antitrust legality by measuring the settlement’s
anticompetitive effects solely against patent law policy, rather than by
measuring them against procompetitive antitrust policies as well.”198
By ensuring that judges take into account antitrust concerns rather than
rubberstamping patent settlements as was done pre-Actavis, AB 824
codifies the Actavis recognition that antitrust scrutiny can coexist with
patent protections.
Returning to the legislative intent underlying patent law, courts
have noted that “the fundamental purpose of patent law is to
promote innovation and the disclosure of inventions so that ultimately
new discoveries may benefit the public at large.”199 AB 824 does not
interfere with this goal of promoting innovation. Its language includes
numerous carveouts to ensure that competitive settlements are not
unfairly affected while ensuring that settlements that would harm the
public are subject to scrutiny. Because this legislation does not depart
from patent law’s innovation intent and because the Supreme Court
has explicitly recognized the necessity of antitrust scrutiny coexisting
with patent settlements, AB 824 does not appear to be preempted by
federal patent law.
5. AB 824’s Role in Lowering Drug Prices—Survey of
Complementary Solutions
Finally, in assessing whether this legislation will impact high
drug pricing, it is important to examine the overall pharmaceutical
landscape. Some calculations have suggested that savings from a ban
on pay-for-delay arrangements could save consumers approximately
$3.5 billion per year.200 Others have found “a transfer from consumers
to producers” of approximately $12 to $14 billion per year’s delay of
generic entry.201 The total U.S. expenditure on pharmaceuticals for
2016, however, was estimated to be approximately $480 billion.202 Of
197. Id. at 158.
198. Id. at 148.
199. In re Cipro Cases I & II, 348 P.3d 845, 857 (Cal. 2015) (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150–51 (1989)).
200. Leibowitz Speech, supra note 25, at 1.
201. Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust, supra note 22, at 650.
202. Nancy L. Yu et al., Spending on Prescription Drugs in the US: Where Does All the Money
Go?, HEALTH AFFS.: BLOG (July 31, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog2018
0726.670593/full.
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this $480 billion, $323 billion (two-thirds of the total amount) went to
drug manufacturers, while the other third went to the supply chain.203
AB 824 targets a key portion of these expenditures—the drug
manufacturers—by preventing anticompetitive agreements between
them. There are still potential inefficiencies from both the
manufacturers and supply chain sectors that other policies could
reduce or eliminate.
Some state legislatures have introduced bills that more directly
set limits on drug pricing.204 Some of these bills, such as Maryland’s,
impose a burden on drug manufacturers to explain certain price
increases—Maryland suggests a 50 percent increase figure as a
potential violation in the bill’s text—or pay a fine.205 Others, like New
York’s, require drug manufacturers to reimburse the state if their drug
prices exceed price targets set by the Department of Health.206 These
bills benefit from directly setting limits and controls on prices.
However, some have noted that their scope remains limited—
Maryland’s law solely deals with generic drugs while New York’s is
limited to Medicaid payments.207 Other state pricing bills have taken
a more comprehensive approach, but these bills have not progressed
past committee.208
Other methods to bring down costs have also been proposed.
Some have suggested implementing final-offer arbitration between
drug manufacturers and drug purchasers (such as pharmacy benefit
managers) to force a more reasonable solution for drug pricing
disputes.209 Others have proposed modeling or modifying price
gouging laws meant to curb gouging in times of crisis to include
pharmaceutical products.210 More dramatic approaches—such as
203. Id.
204. See Primer, Curbing Unfair Drug Prices: A Primer for States, from Aaron Berman et al. 6,
18–19 (Aug. 2017) [hereinafter Aaron Berman Primer] (identifying in the appendix thirteen states
and the District of Columbia that have proposed or enacted direct pricing bills).
205. Id. at 6; H.B. 631, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2-803(A) (Md. 2017).
206. See Aaron Berman Primer, supra note 204, at 6; S. 2007B, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess., at 4–13
(N.Y. 2017).
207. See Aaron Berman Primer, supra note 204, at 6.
208. Id.; see, e.g., S.627, 190th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2017); S.793, 79th Or. Legis.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2017).
209. Eric Lamm, Comment, Keeping Consumers Out of the Crossfire: Final-Offer Arbitration
in the Pharmaceutical Market, 65 UCLA L. REV. 926, 957–58 (2018).
210. Michelle M. Mello & Rebecca E. Wolitz, Legal Strategies for Reining in
“Unconscionable” Prices for Prescription Drugs, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 897–905 (2020).
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nationalizing the pharmaceutical industry through the creation of a
medicines agency—have also been proposed.211
Given the multitude of factors that drive drug prices, some states
have also introduced bills requiring drug manufacturers to publicly
report major cost data.212 These bills would allow the public to more
easily understand when drug manufacturers are engaging in price
gouging by revealing different factors such as costs associated with
research and development, manufacturing, marketing, advertising,
and regulatory approval.213 Supported by this information, the public
could then demand further action by regulators, legislators, and the
companies to lower exorbitant prices.214 Not all of the state bills,
however, require comprehensive disclosure of the different factors,
and not all bills apply to every marketed drug.215 These limitations
could prevent the public and legislators from becoming fully
informed, which might hinder the push for further drug price reform.
In addition, this puts the burden on the public to constantly monitor
and push for further legislative or regulatory action, rather than
legislators simply imposing price caps.
At an agency level, federal antitrust enforcers could undertake
further actions against anticompetitive scenarios in various sectors of
the pharmaceutical industry. For instance, in addition to collusive
agreements between drug manufacturers themselves, there is intense
concentration in the principal agents for pharmaceutical purchasers.
One report estimated that within the pharmaceutical benefit manager
sector, 70–75 percent of all prescription claims are handled by the top
three companies.216 In the pharmaceutical wholesaler industry, the top
211. Fran Quigley, Tell Me How It Ends: The Path to Nationalizing the U.S. Pharmaceutical
Industry, U. MICH. J.L. REFORM (forthcoming).
212. See Aaron Berman Primer, supra note 204, at 7, 15–17 (identifying in the appendix
fourteen states that have proposed drug cost transparency bills).
213. Id. at 7.
214. Id.
215. See id. at 7–8 (noting that “[m]ost bills exist on a spectrum” between transparency
mandates, which call for public disclosure of specified information, and reporting mandates, which
require reports to be provided only to regulators).
216. Yu et al., supra note 202 (“Within the PBM industry, approximately 70–75 percent of all
prescription claims are handled by the top three companies: Express Scripts, CVS Caremark, and
OptumRx. The first two, which account for more than half of the industry’s prescription drug
claims, disclose gross profits for their PBM/pharmacy services business. United Healthcare reports
OptumRx’s revenues, to which we applied a 5 percent margin (comparable to CVS Caremark’s) to
estimate its gross profits, bringing total profits for the ‘big three’ to a little more than $17 billion.”).
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three wholesalers receive 85–90 percent of drug distribution revenues,
with the top two wholesalers together receiving over 60 percent of
revenues.217 If antitrust agencies are interested in spurring different
firms to compete on pricing, bringing actions to decrease the
concentration of different sectors within the pharmaceutical market
could be beneficial. This could run into judicial hurdles, but it presents
a further opportunity to leverage the antitrust laws in favor of lowering
drug costs.218
Assuming no nationalization or national price caps, each solution
by itself is insufficiently comprehensive to bring about reasonable
drug prices. However, all offer a partial fix. AB 824 thus might
represent one part of a larger tapestry of price-decreasing solutions.
Although it remains a limited solution, AB 824 targets a clear
inefficiency within the system—agreements that prevent pricelowering competition between drug manufacturers—and attempts to
eliminate that efficiency.
IV. CONCLUSION
Scholars have recognized the toll pay-for-delay arrangements
take on consumers for the last fifteen years.219 Despite the
understanding of this problem, the rule of reason approach taken by
federal courts still places a heavy burden on enforcers. Federal
legislation to shift the burden to companies has stalled, and no other
states have passed legislation on this issue.
Given the need for agencies to address these issues, California’s
recent law presents a step forward. While stopping short of per se
illegality, shifting the burden to drug manufacturers will make it easier
to prevent anticompetitive pay-for-delays arrangements. The
legislation’s focus on value and numerous exceptions may undermine
its ability to capture increasingly complex pay-for-delay
manifestations in which an exchange of value is difficult to detect.
However, its application to every transaction where there is an
exchange of value is a significant improvement to the prior rule of
reason analysis.

217. Id.
218. See Newman, supra note 143 (arguing that proponents of antitrust reform must not ignore
the role of federal judges in antitrust enforcement).
219. Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 13, at 1557.
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While this legislation represents only one piece of the solution to
high drug prices, there is no panacea for drug pricing problems short
of a comprehensive, widely applied cap on drug prices. Accordingly,
California’s pay-for-delay legislation could work in tandem with other
policy proposals—such as certain price caps, greater transparency
requirements, negotiations—to target the inefficiencies in the
pharmaceutical industry and help reduce drug costs.
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